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CASE NOTES
impending litigation confronting him if the class action is found to
be defective and is not permitted to . continue. 126
In conclusion, the Supreme Court's decision in American Pipe
& Construction Co. v. Utah that the timely commencement of a
bona fide class action, under Rule 23 of the Federal Miles of Civil
Procedure, tolls the applicable federal statute of limitations as to
every member of the represented class is endorsed as a wise and
prudent resolution of a long unanswered and "important question
affecting the administration of justice in the federal courts." 27 This
ruling is consonant with the "effectuation of the purposes of litiga-
tive efficiency and economy" 128 which underlie Rule 23, the intrinsic
representative nature of class actions, and the principles of basic
fairness which should pervade every judicial proceeding. However,
it is submitted that the Court's application of the aforementioned
rule to cases where class action status is denied after the expiration
of the applicable limitation period is encumbered with inherent
injustice. The tolling of a federal statute of limitations for each and
every asserted member of the class, under these circumstances,
carries the attendant potential for purported class members to derive
an, unjust benefit to the severe and unwarranted detriment of the
defendant. It is urged that the Supreme Court avail itself of the next
opportunity to reconsider its ruling on this issue in American Pipe,
for when a suit is stripped of its character as a class action the
dominant concern should be always with the basic principles of
' fairness, thus ensuring that the individual rights of all the parties to
the original suit are not diminished.
KENNETH S. PRINCE
Labor Law—Interaction of Title VII and the National Labor Rela-
tions Act—Union Exclusivity and Individual Rights—Western Addi-
tion Community Organization v. NLRB.'—The Emporium (the
Company), a large San Francisco department store, was both inte-
grated and unionized. A collective bargaining agreement was in
effect which vested exclusive bargaining power in the hands of the
union. This agreement included an anti-discrimination clause, pro-
vided for referral of grievances to the adjustment board, and al-
lowed either party to insist on binding arbitration if the adjustment
board failed to reach a settlement within one week. 2
125 The authority for such a notice requirement may be found in Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(5),
and also, at least arguably, in Rule 23(d)(2), quoted in note 16 supra.
122 414 U.S. at 545.
125 Id. at 556.	 '
485 F.2d 917, 83 L.R.R.M. 2738 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3468
(U.S. Feb. 19, 1974) (No. 73-830).
2 485 F.2d at 919-20, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2739.
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Despite the safeguards embodied within the collective bargain-
ing agreement, minority workers were not satisfied with their prog-
ress in the Company. At a series of meetings in April 1968 a group
of workers, including Tom Hawkins and James Hollins, submitted
grievances to their union representative. As their collective bargain-
ing agreement provided for a grievance procedure, submission of
their complaints to the union was an appropriate step. The union
agreed`to investigate and, later that month, announced preliminary
findings that raised the possibility of discrimination in the
Emporium's promotion policies. A group of employees again met
with the union representative in May, but they agreed to delay the
investigation. In September, having investigated the situation, a
union representative announced his conclusions to a group of em-
ployees and to representatives of the Fair Employment Practices
Committee (FEPC) and the Economic Opportunity Council (EOC).
He informed them that the Company had indeed been discriminat-
ing against minority workers. Adhering to the procedures in the
collective bargaining agreement, he decided that the union would
demand an adjustment board proceeding and, if necessary, binding
arbitration. 3
Although the union was following the steps of the collective
bargaining agreement, some workers felt frustrated with the situa-
tion and suggested picketing the store. Neither the union representa-
tives nor the EOC and FEPC representatives supported a departure
from the contract provisions. At the adjustment board meeting on
October 16, the union agent attempted to present evidence of the
Company's discrimination by questioning individual employees.
Hollins, speaking for three other workers, interrupted, objecting to
the procedure adopted and stating that they would only act as a
group.' Unsuccessfully, Rollins demanded a conference with the
president of the Company. Their efforts frustrated, Hawkins and
Hollins called a press conference to announce that the Company
engaged in racist conduct. The following Saturday, on their own
time, the two workers picketed the store, giving out handbills call-
ing-the Emporium a "20th century colonial plantation." The two
received a warning to refrain from the picketing, but they renewed
their activities and were discharged. 4
Representing the two discharged workers, Western Addition
Community Organization filed a charge with the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB or the Board) alleging that the Company
had violated section 8(a)(1) 5 of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA or the Act). This section prohibits discharge of employees
whose activities are protected under section 7 6 of the Act. The trial
examiner's chief concern was whether the workers had disrupted the
' Id. at 920, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2739-40.
Id. at 921-23, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2740-42.
5
 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
6
 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970), quoted in text at note 27 infra.
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orderly procedure prescribed by the union's collective bargaining
agreement with the Company. He believed the employees' activities
undermined the right of employees to bargain collectively through
their representatives and unduly handicapped union efforts to re-
solve the issue. He also believed that the activities had placed an
unreasonable burden on the employer by requiring him to negotiate
with two separate groups. Consequently, protection for these ac-
tivities was denied.'
In support of the workers, the trial examiner stated that their
actions were based on a good faith belief that their employer did
discriminate against minorities.° Moreover, he determined that the
union was making a bona fide effort, pursuant to the procedures
enumerated within the collective bargaining agreement, to eliminate
the Emporium's racist policies. 9 By ignoring these union efforts, the
minority workers were, he found, actually attempting direct negoti-
ations with their employer rather than merely presenting a
grievance. 10
Despite two vigorous dissents, the Board adopted the trial
examiner's findings and conclusions.' ' In one dissent, Member Jenk-
ins argued that the union should not be able to preempt efforts to
eliminate racial discrimination. To support this argument, he refer-
red to the union's duty of fair representation and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. 12
 The other dissenter, Member Brown, felt
that the trial examiner had misconstrued the nature of the activities.
At most the workers were presenting a grievance and were not
attempting to negotiate."
Western Addition appealed the Board's decision and presented
the issue whether the employees' concerted activities to protest the
employer's racially discriminatory personnel practices were unpro-
tected when these activities interfered with the union's status as the
exclusive bargaining representative. The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the Board's
decision and HELD: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of l964 14
protects independent efforts to protest racial discrimination despite
the existence of prescribed grievance procedures within the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, if the employees reasonably believe the
union is not remedying the discrimination to the 'fullest extent
possible, by the most expedient and efficacious means." 15 Despite
this unequivocal language, the court remanded the case to the
192 N.L.R.B. 173, 186, 77 L.R.R.M. 1669, 1671 (1971) (trial examiner's opinion).
8
 Id. at 184 (trial examiner's opinion).
9
 Id. at 185, 77 L,R.R.M. at 1670-71 (trial examiner's opinion).
1 ° Id. at 185-86, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1671 (trial examiner's opinion).
11
 Id. at 173, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1671.
12
 Id. at 174-76, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1672, 1674, 1676 (dissenting opinion).
'' Id. at 178-79, 77 L.R.R.M, at 1677 (dissenting opinion).
14
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970). For discussion of the relevant sections of Title VII,
see text at notes 132-34 infra.
13
 485 F.2d at 931, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2 748 (emphasis in original).
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Board to determine if the language used during the picketing was so
disloyal to their employer as to deprive the activity of section 7
protection. 16
Although the majority's decision partially satisfied Western
Addition's demands, Judge Wyzanski dissented, arguing for greater
protection of minority employees. He felt that, in any event, the
minority should be able to bargain directly with the employer on
...issues peculiar to them.' 7
 Referring to Title VII and the Fifth,
Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Con-
stitution, he argued that racial issues have a unique statutory and'
constitutional status and should be free from the control of the
union's white majority.I 8
 As he found the question of disloyalty not
properly before the court, he rejected the need to remand the case.' 9
The court in Western Addition was confronted with the prob-
lem of accommodating two congressional enactments—the NLRA
and the Civil Rights' Act of 1964. Both affect the relationships which
exist between the employee and the union, and between the em-
ployee and management, when allegations of discrimination are
made. Consequently, both purport to answer whether an individual
may protest discrimination independently of his exclusive represen-
tative. Although the NLRA protects the right of individuals to
engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing, it also encourages creation of unions for that purpose. 2 ° The
need for stability in industrial relations 21 has resulted in strengthen-
ing the union and the collective bargaining process and subordinat-
ing the rights of the individual worker. Whereas the NLRA em-
phasizes the collective, the Civil Rights Act attempts to protect
individuals from discrimination by prohibiting union and employer
discrimination. The Western Addition decision attempts to reconcile
the policies of these two statutes. It requires individuals to initiate
grievances against the employer with the union, thereby supporting
the collective bargaining agreement; but it also permits employees to
use other remedies when the union does not comply with an unusu-
ally rigorous standard in combatting the discrimination.
This note will examine those sections of the NLRA that pertain
to both individual rights and the requirements of collective bargain-
ing,' and will, in addition, focus upon two Supreme Court decisions
that illuminate the conflict between these sections. The decision of
the Ninth Circuit in Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd. v. NLRB, 22 an
exemplar of this traditional resolution, will be compared with West-
ern Addition. The note will also consider the rationale of R.C. Can
16 Id. at 931-32, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2748.
17 Id. at 939, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2754 (dissenting opinion).
" Id. at 938-40, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2754-55 (dissenting opinion).
19 Id. at 940, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2755-56 (dissenting opinion).
2°
 29 U.S.C. ** 157, 159(a) (1 970).
21
 29 U.S.C. * 151 (1970).
22 419 F.2d 216, 72 L,R.R.M. 2866 (9th Cir. 1969).
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v. NLRB, 23 which represents a unique, albeit minority, approach to
the problem raised by the conflict between individual and collective
rights. It will be pointed out that the Western Addition court relied
on reasoning similar to that enunciated in R.0 . Can as a basis for its
holding and that such reasoning may be self-deceptive. The tradi-
tional safeguard to protect individual rights—the duty of fair
representation—will also be analyzed and compared with the hold-
ing in Western Addition as an alternative to requiring exhaustion of
contractual remedies. Finally, the basis for the court's reliance on
Title VII and a rationale for its effect on traditional labor disputes
will be examined.
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF COLLECTIVE
•BARGAINING UNDER THE NLRA
In the days preceding Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, man-
agement dominated the nascent labor movement within the United
States. To rectify this inequity, Congress in 1935 enacted the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, the primary purpose of which' was to
establish the right of workers to organize and to bargain collectively.
Senator Wagner of New York, the architect and chief sponsor of the
act, believed that workers "were caught in the labyrinth of modern
industrialism and dwarfed by the size of corporate enterprise" 24 and
that only through cooperation could they obtain freedom and
dignity. 25 The heart of the Wagner Act is section 7, which supplies a
permanent legal foundation for the right of employees to organize
and bargain collectively. 26 Specifically, section 7 protects the right
of employees "to self-organization, to form . . . labor organizations,
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .. ."27 It
should be noted that section 7 distinguishes between the right to
bargain collectively through a representative and the right of the
worker to engage in activities for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing. This distinction clearly, indicates that workers, on their own,
may also engage in collective bargaining activity. 28
23 328 F.2d 974, 55 L.R.R.M. 2642 (5th Cir. 1964).
24 79 Cong. Rec. 7565 (1935) (remarks of Sen. Wagner).
15 Id.
15 A. Cox, Law and the National Labor Policy 7 (1960).
27 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970) (emphasis added).
2° NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 349 F.2d 1, 3 (9th Cir. 1965). Yet the
legislative history of section 7 reveals that all concerted activity is not protected. Early Board
decisions indiscriminately protecting concerted activity prompted an unfavorable response in
the House of Representatives. In an attempt to amend the NLRA, the House proposed an
amendment which excluded section 7 protection from unfair labor practices, unlawful con-
certed activities and violations of collective bargaining contracts. The amendment was even-
tually dropped because Congress was satisfied that recent Board decisions had adopted these
principles.• Moreover, it was felt that enumeration of specific prohibitions would endorse
activities not specifically cited. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 38-39 (1947).
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Another cornerstone of national labor policy, section 9(a),
conflicts in part with section 7. Section 9(a) empowers elected
officials to represent the workers. It provides: .
Representatives . . . selected for the purposes of collective
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit . ,
shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees
in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment . . . 29
The proviso of section. 9(a) illustrates the limits imposed on indi-
vidual action. While it authorizes the employees to present griev-
ances directly to the employer, this right is sharply limited to ad-
justments which do not interfere with the collective bargaining
agreement. Moreover, the bargaining representative must have the
opportunity to be present at any adjustment. The presumption that
differential treatment of workers would weaken collective bargain-
ing and result in industrial instability was the rationale behind this
limitation on worker's individual rights. 30
' The conflict between sections 7 and 9 is thus apparent. While
section 9 provides that only the representative may bargain collec-
tively, section 7 allows individuals to engage in activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining. Where an employee's concerted
activities interfere with the exclusive powers of his collective bar-
gaining agent, one must yield. -
When called upon to decide the proper relationship betweeen
the individual and the union under the NLRA, the Supreme Court
has strongly favored collective bargaining through an elected rep-
resentative. In an early decision, Medo Photo Supply Corp. v.
NLRB, 3 ' a majority of the workers had designated a bargaining
representative and the employer had recognized the union as the
exclusive bargaining agent. Despite this representation, a group of
workers, speaking for a probable majority of the bargaining unit,
approached the company manager to discuss a wage increase. The
manager subsequently met with the employees, never having spoken
with the bargaining agent, and told them the company would agree
to their requests. As a result of these behind-the-scene negotiations,
the workers notified the union representative that they no longer
desired to have him represent them; and the manager refused to
negotiate with the union, claiming they no longer represented a
majority of the workers. 32 Even though it was suggested that these
29
 29 U.S.C. 159(a) (1970). In revising 9(a) for the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress hoped
to clarify the Wagner Act. Their intention was to make it clear that workers and employers
could discuss and settle grievances as long as they did not conflict with collective bargaining.
H.R. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1947); S. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
24-25 (1947).
30
 H.R. Rep, No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 ( 1935).
31
 321 U.S. 678 (1944).
32
 Id. at 680-81.
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workers were a majority, the Court held that it was the employer's
duty to negotiate only with the designated union representative."
The Court determined that the public interest would be best served
by preserving the union's exclusive right to conduct collective
bargaining. 34 While the Court did not discuss the appropriateness of
-the workers' actions, one can infer; that these activities were not
protected by section 7 because they too were disruptive of the
collective bargaining process. Superficially viewed, this decision
might appear to place form over substance. Collective bargaining is
designed as a means to represent the majority in negotiations with
the employer; but it has other, unexpected side effects. It forecloses
negotiating activity by the workers on their own. Consequently this
opinion should be viewed as favoring collective bargaining as an
end in itself and against the rights of, individuals though they repre-
sent a majority. As Medo reveals, once a union has been selected as
the bargaining. agent, the individual no longer has the right to
engage in activities for the purpose; of collective bargaining.
A more recent and instructive Supreme Court pronouncement,
NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 35 also addressed itself
to limits placed on the worker's protected section 7 activities. Al-
though the activity arguably under section 7 protection was the right
of the individual to refrain from any concerted activity, 36 the Court
did not make a narrow determination based on the facts and issues
of the case:- Instead,' the Court issued a general pronouncement
based on the "manifest purpose of a coherent national labor
policy."37 Consequently a "literal" reading of section 7 was rejected
and the right of the union to punish workers who were arguably
exercising section 7 rights was upheld. 38 In reaching this conclusion,
the Court elaborated its understanding of national labor policy:
National labor policy has been built on the premise that by
pooling their economic strength; and acting through a labor
organization freely chosen by the majority, the employees
of a . . . unit have the most effective means of bargaining
for improvements in wages, hours, and working condi-
tions. The policy therefore extinguishes the individual
employee's power to order his own relations with his em-
Ployer and creates a power vested in the chosen representa-
tive to act in the interests of all employees. 39
Similarly it would appear that the right of the individual to engage
33 Id. at 684.
34
 Id. at 687.
35 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
36
 Section 7 provides that leimployees shall have the right to .
	 . engage in
	 . .
concerted activities , .. , and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities
	 .	 ." 29 U.S.C.'§ 157 (1970).
37 388 U.S. at 178-79.
3° Id.
39 Id. at 180.
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in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
will be rejected as requiring too literal a reading of section 7 and as
contravening national labor policy. As the Court has elaborated,
national labor policy is premised on the idea that a worker will be
represented by a union, with the necessary consequence that the
individual may no longer adjust his own relations with his em-
ployer. The union's right under the NLRA and the Allis-Chalmers
decision is the exclusive right to negotiate with the employer about
conditions of employment. Following the Court's logic, the indi-
vidual is barred from bargaining with his employer regardless of the
wording of section 7.
Western Addition involved a conflict between the section 7
rights of individual workers and the section 9(a) powers of their
union representative. 40 The trial examiner found that the workers'
activities were unprotected, as they encompassed negotiations with
their employer about a condition of employment, and that this
activity belonged in the exclusive province of the union. 41 In an
earlier case, Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd. v. NLRB, 42 the Ninth
Circuit was faced with a conflict similar to that which confronted
the District of Columbia Circuit in Western Addition. Both cases
involved allegations of discrimination and both attempted to define
proper and improper section 7 activity. Whereas Tanner relied on
traditional concepts outlined above, Western Addition broke away
and established a new standard to determine the range of protected
activity.
Both courts accepted the initial premise that concerted activity
for the purpose of collective bargaining was permitted under section
7. 43
 But when they considered the effect of section 9(a), the two
courts reached different conclusions. While the District of Columbia
Circuit felt that Title VII limited the requirements of section 9(a),
the Ninth Circuit relied on traditional concepts of labor law and
upheld the exclusivity of section 9(a). 44 In Western Addition, the
workers' independent activities were protected, while in Tanner,
similar conduct was held unprotected. The District of Columbia
Circuit attempted to distinguish Tanner on the basis of the factual
differences between the two cases. 45 But this explanation is incom-
plete and ignores the dramatic change brought by the court's utiliza-
tion of Title VII.
In Tanner, two workers sought to encourage their employer to
hire black taxicab drivers. Neither employee approached their union
representative to suggest a program of black hiring. One worker,
4° 485 F.2d at 925-26, 83 L.R,R.M. at 2744.
41 192 N.L.R.B. at 185-86, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1671 (trial examiner's opinion).
42 419 F.2d 216, 72 L.R.R.M. 2866 (9th Cir. 1969).
43 Id. at 218, 72 L.R.R.M. at 2867-68; 485 F.2d at 924, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2742.
44 419 F.2d at 221, 72 L.R.R.M. at 2870; 485 F.2d at 927, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2745.
43 485 F.2d at 929, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2746..
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Abramson, asked his supervisor whether he objected to hiring
Negroes and whether he would consider a particular Negro appli-
cant. The other worker, Dorbin, joined a picket line to protest the
discriminatory practices of the company. Both were discharged that
evening, but Dorbin was reinstated the following morning; Abram-
son, however, was not reinstated. 46 The court concluded that the
two employees had an obligation to go to the union with their desire
for nondiscriminatory hiring.'" Consequently, the activity ran afoul
of section 9, and lost the section 7 protection it would otherwise
have had. Reasoning that this result was dictated by the demands of
orderly bargaining, the court felt unable to consider protection for
these activities.
The District of Columbia Circuit pointed out that in Western
Addition, unlike Tanner, the two workers had attempted to use the
procedure set out in the collective bargaining agreement. 48 They
initiated discussion of discriminatory practices with the union rep-
resentative in April 1968 and continued working within the ap-
proved system through the middle of October. At this time, they
became dissatisfied with the union's individual approach which had
reaped meager results, and demanded that the union adopt a group
approach which would benefit all minority workers. Unsuccessful in
this effort to change the union's policy, they abandoned their collec-
tive bargaining representation and sought unsuccessfully to talk to
the company president. Shortly afterwards, they began picketing
and distributing leaflets on their own. 49 The Western Addition court
rationalized its differences with Tanner on the basis of one fact. In
Western Addition the workers did approach the union and attempt
to work within it; in Tanner no such effort was made.
Whether or not one seeks recourse through the union may,
under some circumstances, be a basis for determining the protected
nature of the particular activity. However, the results of Tanner and
Western Addition cannot be adequately explained in this manner.
The opinions present inconsistent ideas regarding the requirements
of collective bargaining. The Tanner court denied protection be-
cause it believed that the dictates of section 9(a) required workers to
present demands concerning working conditions through their union
representative. 50 In deference to section 9(a), the Western Addition
decision requires workers to initiate grievances which are properly
the subject of collective bargaining with their collective representa-
tive. But contrary to section 9(a), Western Addition also allows
46 419 F.2d at 221-22, 72 L,R.R.M. at 2871. Other evidence raised by Tanner, but
disputed by Abramson, was that he knew about a news broadcast unfavorable to the
company. Id. at 221, 72 L. R. R. M. at 2871.
41 Id. at 221-22, 72 L.R.R.M. at 2870-71,
" 485 F.2d at 929, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2746.
44 Id. at 920-23, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2739-42.
5° 419 F.2d at 221, 72 L.R.R.M. at 2870.
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them to act independently if the union is not meeting an unusually
strict standard." Furthermore, the Western Addition court afforded
protection for the workers' activities despite their considerable inter-
ference with the means chosen by the union and provided for in the
collective bargaining contract. 52
Admittedly, the Tanner court was not confronted with a situa-
tion where the workers did go to the union before commencing
independent action. Nevertheless, the court's conception of union
organization would not support such an outcome in any event.
Protection of collective bargaining and of orderly union procedures
were of paramount importance to the Ninth Circuit, 53 whose al-
legiance to Allis-Chalmers and to NLRB v. Draper Corp. 54 pre-
cluded any such departure from the principle of complete union
control in the collective bargaining process. 55
In Draper, a group of workers struck without authorization of
the union, allegedly because of a management-inspired delay in the
collective bargaining negotiations. 56 Although these workers did not
present separate demands and there was no evidence of a split
between the workers and the union, the Draper court nevertheless
found the activity unprotecte'd. 57 The court said:
Minority groups must acquiesce in the action of the major-
ity and the bargaining agent they have chosen; and, just as
a minority has no right to enter into separate bargaining
arrangements with the employer, so it has no right to take
independent action to interfere with the course of bargain-
ing which is being carried on by the duly authorized bar-
gaining agent chosen by the majority. 58
Consequently, section 7 -rights appear quite restricted under this
ruling. Clearly one would not be able to bargain with one's em-
ployer over a condition of employment if one is represented by a
51 485 F.2d at 931, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2748.
- 52
 Id. at 929, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2746.
53 419 F.2d at 221, 72 L.R.R.M. at 2870.
14 145 F.2d 199, 15 L.R.R.M. 580 (4th Cir. 1944).
55
 419 F.2d at 219-20, 72 L.R.R.M. at 2868-69. Four years later, in a case that did not
involve racial issues, the Ninth Circuit discussed its earlier decision in Tanner:
In N.L.R. El. v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., . . this court recognized the trend to
insure utilization of internal remedies as opposed to sanctioning individual efforts,
the result of which strengthens the union vis-a-vis the employer, modulates the
collective bargaining process, and yet influences the union majority so that long
range effective action can be taken to implement the interests of the dissenting
minority.
NLRB v. Universal Servs., Inc., 467 F.2d 579, 586, 81 L.R.R.M. 2492, 2497 (9th Cir. 1972).
Because the workers in Universal had approached their union officers, the court was able to
extend its holding in Tanner. They held that the workers'were required not only to approach
their leaders but also to allow the available internal remedies to run their course." Id.
5°
 145 F.2d at 201, 15 L.R.R,M. at 582. '
57
 Id. at 204, 15 L.R.R.M. at 585. 	 .
59
 Id, at 203, 15 L.R.R,M. at 584.
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union; but additionally one may not even attempt, without union
approval, to encourage management to come to the bargaining
table. The Draper rule goes further than Tanner in restricting sec-
tion 7 rights. The Tanner workers were more clearly acting within
the province of the bargaining agent, as they were negotiating about
a condition of employment. Thus the Tanner court's allegiance to
Draper evidences an even stronger commitment to a restricted view
of section 7 rights. Namely, where there is a bargaining representa-
tive, almost any concerted activity by a minority, not authorized by
the representative, is not protected by section 7.
The Supreme Court, in Allis-Chalmers, - provided the Ninth
Circuit with additional support for restricting section 7 rights. The
Tanner court accepted the Supreme Court's intimation that "by
joining a union an employee gives up or waives some of his section 7
rights."59 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit determined that the de-
nial of section 7 protection to the protesting employees, Dorbin and
Abramson, was both consistent with and required by the national
labor policy enunciated in the NLRA as interpreted by the Supreme
Court. 6°
The Tanner court had few qualms accepting this restriction of
individual rights since they felt other safeguards were adequate. The
court felt that a minority, although unsuccessful in gaining majority
support, could still influence ultimate union policies, for the union
must take all interests into account and arrive at a compromise
which must be approved by the majority of workers in the unit."
The court also noted that additional guarantees for individual rights
were found in other sections of the NLRA which make democratic
procedures a legal requirement. 62 With such safeguards, the court
believed that individuals should not be free to seek remedies inde-
pendently of the union. 63
Whereas the Tanner decision stresses majority rule within the
union, a unified bargaining position vis-à-vis the employer, and
utilization of internal remedies, the Western Addition decision
reasons that these objectives must be compromised in the interest of
another goal, the elimination of discriminatory employment prac-
tices. In so reasoning, the District of Columbia Circuit broke not
only with Tanner but also with Medo, Allis-Chalmers, and Draper
cases which have established major principles in our national labor
59
 419 F.2d at 220, 72 L.R.R.M. at 2869, quoting NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.,
388 U.S. 175, 200 (1967). For more detailed discussion of Allis -Chalmers, see text at notes
35-39 supra.
60 419 F.2d at 221, 72 L.R.R.M. at 2870.
61 Id.
02
 The court was referring to the Landrum-Griffin Amendments, 29 U.S.C, § 411 (1970).
Section 411(a)(1) provides union members with a bill of rights, including the right to nominate
candidates, to vote in union elections, and to participate in votes on union business. Addition-
ally, § 411(a)(2) secures the rights to assemble with other members and to speak freely at
meetings.
63 419 F.2d at 221, 72 L.R.R.M. at 2870.
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policy. Although Western Addition does defer to traditional labor
concepts in requiring initial recourse to the union, this is merely a
gesture, for a worker need not continue with the union for any
length of time or through any number of the prescribed steps. His
activity will be protected if the union fails to meet the standard set
out—whether the discrimination is being remedied "to the fullest
extent possible, by the most expedient and efficacious means.""
Additionally, a worker will be protected even if his action is only
based on a reasonable belief that the union is not meeting the
required standard. 65
Although it is the more popular, the Tanner rationale is not the
only one which courts have employed to resolve the conflicts which
arise between sections 7 and 9. Another decision, NLRB v. R.C.
Can Co., 66 suggests an alternative approach. In R.C. Can, the Fifth
Circuit afforded protection to a striking minority acting without
union approval. A small group of employees had picketed entrances
to the plant to pressure their employer to negotiate with the union. 67
The court reasoned that the strike sought to generate support for
union demands and that the means used did not involve "disagree-
ment with, repudiation or criticism of, a policy or decision previ-
ously taken by the union . . ."68 Under the R.C. Can rule,
therefore, minority action is protected if it is in support of union
demands and is not critical of the union policies. 69
In cases involving racial discrimination, Wean be easily argued
that the protesting minority is voicing the policy of the union and
hence deserving of protection. The union is legally obliged to repre-
sent its members fairly and without discrimination. 70 Union mem-
bers-seeking nondiscriminatory employment practices are presump-,
tively in accord with the union's position; otherwise, the union
would be guilty of an unfair labor practice.'" This is the rationale
which the Board utilized in Tannern and which the Ninth Circuit
" 485 F.2d at 931, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2748 (emphasis in the original).
65 It may be queried whether according to this decision a reasonable belief concerning
the union's effort to eliminate discrimination is sufficient, for on remand the court instructed
the Board to determine whether the union was in fact remedying the discrimination to the
fullest extent possible. But the whole tenor of the decision and the language directly above
this instruction argue that a reasonable belief is sufficient. Id.
66 328 F.2d 974, 55 L.R.R.M. 2642 (5th Cir. 1964).
67 Id. at 977, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2644.
69 Id. at 979, 55 L.R.R.M. at 2645.
69
 In NLRB v. Shop Rite Foods, Inc., 430 F.2d 786, 790-91, 75 L.R.R.M. 2023, 2026-27
(5th Cir. 1970), the Fifth Circuit later cautioned:
[I]f union objectives are characterized in general terms • • one can assume that in a
great majority of instances minority action will be consistent with one or more of
those objectives. If R.C. Can is not applied with great care it would allow minority
action in a broad range of situations and permit unrestrained undercutting of
collective bargaining.
7° See the discussion of the duty of fair representation in text at notes 80-107 infra.
See the discussion of Board jurisdiction in text at notes 121-22 infra.
'z 166 N.L.R.B. 551, 551-52, 65 L.R.R.M. 1502, 1503 (1967). Rejecting the Ninth
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rejected outright. 73 Fearing that the R.C. Can rationale provided
little support for orderly collective bargaining premised upon demo-
cratic union processes, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed 74 its commit-
ment to principles enunciated in Draper.
Though it is not acknowledged as such, the court in Western
Addition partially adopted the reasoning of R.C. Can and of the
Board in Tanner. Although Western Addition does not sanction
independent action without initial recourse to the union, it permits
the abandonment of the established grievance procedure under cer-
tain circumstances. Significantly, in Western Addition the court
found that "the Union and the petitioners [the two discharged
workers] were not working at cross-purposes, but were both at-
tempting to eradicate racially discriminatory employment
practices."75
 The end result may be appropriate in cases involving
discrimination, but there are flaws in such reasoning. The collective
bargaining agreement with the Retailer's Council, the bargaining
agent for the Company, contained an anti-discrimination clause. 76
Similarly, the union leadership certainly knew that they were re-
quired to satisfy not only the duty of fair representation 77 but the
requirements of Title VII as well. Consequently, an informed union
representative would realize that no effort should be spared in
eradicating any vestige of racial discrimination. Such reasoning
appears faulty, however, if the union leaders do not favor equal
employment opportunities for minority workers, 78
 The incentive to
appear in conformance with the objectives of the minority is gener-
ally absent from other employee activities that threaten the collec-
tive bargaining process. Thus, while there may be precedent to
support an examination of the minority workers' objectives and a
comparison with the union's goals as a basis for approval of minor-
ity activity, the results may not always present an accurate picture
of the union's attitude. 79
Circuit's request to consider the effect of § 9(a) upon concerted activity, the Board said:
[The] Board cannot presume or conclude that, contrary to the course being urged by
Abramson and Dorbin, the Union knowingly would have taken the unlawful posi-
tion that it would refuse to represent Negro drivers fairly if hired; [Mi]e must
assume that these employees were acting in accord with, and in furtherance of, the
lawful position of their bargaining agent. ... For the Board to find, therefore, that
the employee's otherwise protected concerted activities herein were rendered unpro-
tected by virtue of an existing collective-bargaining agreement between Union and
the Respondent would be offensive to public policy.
Id.
" 419 F.2d at 221, 72 L.R.R.M. at 2870.
74
 Id. at 218, 72 L.R.R.M. at 2868.
75 485 F.2d at 930, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2747.
76 For the terms of the contract, see 485 F.2d at 920, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2739.
77
 For a discussion of the duty of fair representation, see text at notes 80-107 infra.
7" 485 F.2d at 937, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2753 (dissenting opinion).
79 See Gould, Black Power in the Unions:' The Impact Upon Collective Bargaining
Relationships, 79 Yale L.J. 46, 59-60 (1969).
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THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION—A SAFEGUARD OF
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST ARBITRARY UNION CONDUCT
The courts have not been insensitive to the potential for abuse .
inherent in the enormous statutory powers granted the unions. This
concern is embodied in the duty of fair representation which re-
quires the union to treat fairly all whom it represents. 8 ° In Steele v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R., 81 the Supreme Court pointed out that
whereas the union has the statutory power to represent all em-
ployees and to make contracts as to wages, hours and working
conditions, it may not engage in racially discriminatory activity. 82
This requirement is especially important because the union is equip-
ped with what are in essence legislative powers, which permit it to
create and restrict the rights of those whom it represents." In
addition to these "legislative" powers, the unions possess "judicial"
control over their membership. Workers are in general contractually
bound to adjust grievances through a procedure in large measure
controlled by the unioti. 84 When a breach of the duty is established;
a worker is permitted to abandon contractually prescribed proce-
dures and resort to judicial remedies.
Both Western Addition and the fair representation cases deal
with means to resolve discrimination apart from union . procedures.
However, to comprehend clearly the potential impact of Western
Addition, one must consider the circumstances under which inde-
pendent action is permitted and the remedies that are then available
under- each rule. In the cases establishing the union's duty of fair
representation, .the proscribed discrimination was blatant; the con-
tractual procedure was clearly -unfair; a stringent test determined a
breach of that duty; and judicial intervention was the appropriate
remedy. -Western Addition, by comparison, provided more options
for the disgruntled worker. Instead of requiring clear instances of
bad faith as a preliminary to alternative action, the Western Addi-
tion court allowed independent action when the union fell below an
especially high standard of efficacy and expediency. Additionally,
the District of Columbia Circuit did not require exclusive resort to
the judiciary, but permitted leafletting and picketing activities. 85
In Steele, the union which purported to act as collective bar-
gaining agent for all the employees of the unit excluded blacks from
membership. Because white workers formed a majority of the. em-
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944).
81 323 U.S. 192 (1944). Steele was decided under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.
* 152, Fourth (1970). But the Court promptly applied the same duty to bargaining representa-
tives covered by the NLRA. See Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1944).
82 323 U.S. at 203.
83 Id, at 202.
U Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965). This case requires a worker to
exhaust grievance-arbitration machinery before proceeding to court. See also Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 171, 192 (1967).
85 485 F.2d at 931, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2748.
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ployees, they were able to elect this union to represent the entire
unit over the protests of the excluded minority." Once in power, the
union attempted to amend existing collective bargaining agreements
to exclude all black firemen from employment. 87 Following Steele a
court has found a breach of the duty of fair representation where the
local union summarily refused a request of its Negro members to
process grievances concerning segregated plant facilities and back
wages." Blatant discrimination could also be found where a sub
rosa agreement prevented the advancement of black employees to
more desirable positions. 89 In Western Addition, the workers
claimed that the company denied promotions to blacks, but there
was no allegation that the union had helped create this situation. Its
conduct having been approved by representatives of two agencies
charged, with eliminating discrimination, the union was proceeding
in accordance with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
Before the courts entertain a case alleging a breach of the duty
of fair representation, they must initially determine whether the
prescribed grievance procedure would operate fairly. In Steele, al-
though the Railway Labor Act 9° arguably required the exclusive use
of administrative remedies, the Supreme Court decided that an
injunction and an award of damages would be permissible." The
Court felt compelled to act lest the blacks be required to appear
before an adjustment board chosen largely by the union. 92 While
reaffirming the requirement that an employee at least attempt to
exhaust the exclusive grievance and arbitration procedures estab-
lished by the collective bargaining agreement, the Supreme Court
has delineated two additional exceptions to this rule. 93 Where the
conduct of the employer amounts to a repudiation of the contractual
procedures, or where the union has the sole power to invoke higher
stages of the grievance procedures and wrongfully refuses to do so,
the doctrine does not apply. 94 In Western Addition, although the
Company president had refused to talk to Hollins, the Company did
not attempt to block the adjustment board proceedings, nor did it
balk at the suggestion of arbitration. 95 Additionally, the union had
not halted discussions by refusing to proceed further. On the con-
trary, the union apparently believed the worker's claims were
justified and appeared ready to demand binding arbitration. 96
96 323 U.S. at 194.
87
 Id. at 195,
88 Rubber Workers Local 12 v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12, 17, 63 L.R.R.M. 2395 (5th Cir.
1966).
89 Glover v, St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 393 U.S. 324 (1969).
99 45 U.S.C, § 153, First, (1) (1970).
91 323 U.S. at 206.
92 Id.
93
 Vacs v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
94 Id. at 184-85.
95 485 F.2d at 921-22, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2740-41.
" Id. at 920, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2740.
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The Supreme Court in Vaca v. Sipes" discussed at consider-
able length the standard required to determine whether a union has
breached its duty of fair representation. At issue was the union's
decision not to request arbitration of a complaint concerning physi-
cal fitness for work. 98
 The Court held the worker must prove more
than that he was fit for work. He must affirmatively show arbitrary
or bad faith conduct by the union. 99 The Court rejected the jury's
award and concluded that as a matter of federal law the evidence
did not support a verdict that the union had breached its duty of fair
representation."° Thus, although the employee had proved to the
jury's satisfaction that he was fit for work, he lost his case as he
failed to prove union bad faith.""
In Western Addition, no one alleged that the union's conduct
fell into this category. 102 The union had issued a statement support-
ing the workers' allegation of discrimination and had also decided to
take a complaint to the adjustment board and, if necessary, to
pursue the matter through arbitration."" Taking the facts at face
value, the strongest criticisms of the union were that it wanted an
individual as opposed to a group approach, that it was using an
admittedly lengthy procedure, and that its action prior to the dis-
charge of the workers had been somewhat tardy. Neither the
,
majority"4
 nor the dissent 1 °5 challenged the union's good faith
efforts to solve the problem, and the petitioners did not bring suit
against the union. As a result, the workers could not have met the
test of arbitrary or bad faith conduct spelled out in Vaca. Neverthe-
less, the workers were afforded greater remedies than if such a
breach had been demonstrated. The Western Addition court upheld
the right of union members to assert their claims of racial discrimi-
97 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
99
 Id. at 173.
99
 Id. at 190-91.
1 " Id.
1 ° 1 In Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the
District of Columbia Circuit applied Vaca to a case involving discrimination. A black worker
claimed that the union had failed to argue his case with the management. When Spector
bought out Jacobs Trucking Co., the plaintiff was employed by Jacobs. Though he lost his
job as a result of the merger, the union did not stress his seniority, argue for an interpretation
of the sale agreement which would increase his chances for employment, or propose employ-
ment alternatives for him. Id. at 988. Here, too, the court said the test of whether there was a
breach of the duty of fair representation was "whether the union's behavior was arbitrary, in
bad faith, unduly perfunctory, or tinged by racial discrimination." Id. at 992. This case was
decided under Title VII. That fact would not affect its application to unions in suits brought
under the NLRA.
102 Petitioner made no such allegation—The trial examiner found that the union was
endeavoring in every way available to it under the collective bargaining agreement to adjust
the discrimination. 192 N.L.R.13. at 185, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1670-71 (trial examiner's opinion).
1 ° 3 485 F.2d at 920, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2740.
104 Id. at 930, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2747.
I" Because he failed to mention it, it is inferred that Judge Wyzanski found no actual
evidence of a breach of the duty of fair representation. Id. at 937-38, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2753-54
(dissenting opinion).
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nation in a manner which they believed would be more successful
than the approach utilized by , their union:106
 The court upheld not
only the right to abandon the grievance procedure and to picket and
leaflet, but condoned other concerted activities falling within the
scope of section 7. 107
Thus, as opposed to the requ4ements of the fair representation
cases, the employee desiring to air his complaint is not required to
prove actual union discrimination or union bad faith in processing
his complaint. He need only assert that the union's approach was
not "the most efficacious or expedient" means possible to eliminate
the discrimination. In addition, Whereas the fair representation
cases upheld only the right of judicial intervention against the
offending union, in Western AdditiOn the workers were permitted to
utilize the entire arsenal of protected activities encompassed by
section 7,
RATIONALE FOR SUPERIMPOSITION OF TITLE VII ON THE NLRA
To justify allowing employees to abandon their contractual
grievance procedure when discrimination is at issue, the court in
Western Addition 108 relied on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. 109
 This reliance was a significant step for several reasons. It
reaffirmed the Board's obligation to search beyond the NLRA for
guidance in deciding cases involving discrimination. More
significantly, it affected the decision substantively, by interpreting
and applying Title VII to limit the exclusive power of the union
representative.
Pointing to the responsibility spelled out by the Supreme Court
in Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB,"° the Western Addition court
held that the Board' must consider' the national policy embodied in
Title VII. 111
 In Southern Steamship the Court had rep-
rimanded the Board for its shortsightedness:
[T]he Board has not been commissioned to effectuate the
policies of the Labor Relations Act so single-mindedly that
it may wholly ignore other and equally important Congres-
sional objectives. Frequently the entire scope of Congres-
sional purpose calls for careful accommodation without
. . . excessive emphasis. upon its immediate task." 2
I" Id. at 931, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2748.
107 Id .
'" Id, at 927, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2745.
109
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), -3(a) (1970), 'Section 2000e-2(a) provides: It shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) ... to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his . . . terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color . . . ." Section 2000e-3(a) provides: "It shall be an unlawful employ-
ment practice for an employer to discriminate aiainst any of his employees . . . because he has
opposed any practice made an unlawful . employment practice by this subchapter,"
H° 316 U.S. 31 (1942).
111
 485 F.2d at 928, 83 L.R.R.M. at 274i
nz 316 U.S. at 47.
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Believing his function to be adjudication under the NLRA and not
the Civil Rights Act, the trial examiner in Western Addition felt
unable to take this step.' 13 Before the full Board, the two dissenters
argued in vain that the NLRA should be administered in light of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. 114 With no apparent second thoughts, the
Board affirmed the trial examiner's decision." 5
The Board's action clearly ignored not only the Supreme Court
in Southern Steamship, but the legislative history of Title VII as
well. This history reveals that Congress did not intend to limit all
cases alleging discrimination in employment to the conciliatory pro-
cedures of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC). During Senate consideration of the Act, Senator Clark, the
floor manager of the .bill, read a letter from the Justice Department
which stated that the enactment of Title VII would in no way alter
the jurisdiction of the Board under the NLRA. 116 Subsequently,
Senator Tower proposed an amendment that would have excluded
other federal. agencies from granting relief from the practices cov-
ered by Title VII. The amendment was defeated by a vote of 59 to
29." 7
 Congress was well aware that the NLRB and the courts
had already evolved means of handling discrimination in
employment." 8 Thus, it appears that it was Congress' intent that
the Board continue to consider the racial aspects of labor disputes
otherwise within its jurisdiction.
In practice, jurisdiction of the Board and the EEOC overlap,
particularly if the union is the discriminator. Racial discrimination
by the union is made ari unlawful employment practice under sec-
tion 2000e-2(c) of Title 'VII," 9 and is consequently within the juris-
diction of the EEOC. 12° Butit is also an unfair labor practice under
section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA, 12 ' as it limits an employee's section7 rights. 122
Finding no cases deciding the issue, the District of Columbia
	113
 192 N.L.R.B. at 185 (trial examiner's opinion).
	 -
i 4
 See the dissents of Members Jenkins and Brown, id. at 177, 179, 77 L.R.R.M. at
1676 (dissenting opinions).
115
 Id. at 173, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1669.
16
 110 Cong. Rec. 7207 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Clark).
117
 Id. at 13,650-52 (remarks of Sen. Tower).
118
 The duty of fair representation was first announced by the Supreme Court in Steele
in 1942. See the discussion of the duty of fair representation in text at notes 80-84 supra.
119 42 U.S.C. § 2000e72(c) (1970).
125
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(f) (1970).
121
 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1970). This section provides: "It shall be an unfair labor
practice for a labor organization or its agents (1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the
exercise of their rights guaranteed in section 157 . . ."
122
 In Rubber Workers Local 12 v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12, 24, 63 L.R.R.M. 2395, 2404
(5th Cir. 1966), the Fifth Circuit affirmed a Board determination upholding its jurisdiction.
From the discussion of federal preemption in Vaca v. Sipes it may be inferred that the
Court acknowledged the Board's jurisdiction in this area. 386 U.S. at 181-83. The concurring
opinion by Justices Fortas and Harlan and Chief Justice Warren, id. at 200-01,. explicitly
decided this question favoring Board jurisdiction.
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Circuit broke new ground 123 when it determined that an employer's
discrimination may also be a violation of the NLRA. 124 The court
did so knowing that the Board's General Counsel had explicitly
avoided labeling the discrimination itself a violation of section
8(a)(1). 125 Significantly, the Board has recently rejected the broad
holding of this case. The Board held that discrimination alone did
not violate sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3). 126 The Board did concede,
however, that with actual evidence of a nexus between the alleged
discriminatory conduct and the interference with employees in the
exercise of their section 7 rights they could find an unfair labor
practice.'" This reluctance to extend its purview to general ques-
tions of discrimination is a common theme in Board decisions.
Consequently, the District of Columbia Circuit's decision in Western
Addition contravenes the Board's propensity to confine itself to the
provisions of the NLRA.
Thus, despite the Board's conservatism, the legislative history
and the court decisions indicate the Western Addition court has
reached the correct decision. Title VII has not endowed the EEOC
with exclusive jurisdiction over discrimination in employment.
Within the framework of the NLRA-, the Board's activities may
freely overlap with those of the EEOC, and moreover, as the court
suggested in Western Addition, under some circumstances the
Board must correct its myopia and acknowledge other national
labor policies that intersect with its jurisdiction.' 28 A determination
of the proper relation between Title VII and the NLRA should be
made soon, as the Supreme Court has agreed to hear the case. 129
Although there is adequate precedent for requiring the Board to
acknowledge the Civil Rights Act and Title VII, it may be queried
how far this requirement should go. In particular, it may be asked
whether the Board should be forced to abandon the exclusivity
concept, even for limited circumstances. The court attempted to
minimize the impact of its decision, stating that concerted activity
123 United Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126, 70 L.R.R.M. 2489 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U:S:` 903 (19.69), See 1972-1973 Annual Survey of Labor Relations
Law, 14 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 1173, 1221-24 (1973).
124
 416 F.2d at 1135, 70 L.R.R.M. at 2497.
122 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970). See 416 F.2d at 1134 n.12, 70 L.R.R.M. at 2494 n.12.
118
 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (3) (1970). See Jubilee Mfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 82
L.R.R.M. 1482 (1973).
122 82 L.R.R.M. at 1484.
128
 There are advantages to bringing grievances to the NLRB rather than before the
EEOC. The Board's procedures are easier and less costly for the individual than the proce-
dures under Title VII. Moreover, the Board has the power to issue cease and desist orders
against those found to be engaging in discriminatory practices, and to order payment of lost
wages or reinstatement. The EEOC's power is limited to encouraging negotiation or initiating
a court suit. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970). See Rosen, Division of Authority Under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Preliminary Study in Federal-State Interagency Relations, 34
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 846, 887 (1966). For the remedies available via an EEOC-initiated court
suit, see generally Comment, 14 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 297 (1972).
128 Cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3468 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1974) (No. 73-830).
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over racial discrimination does not defeat the underlying premise of
section 9(a) and only limits collective bargaining to a "certain
extent." 13 ° It is suggested that collective bargaining, as defined in
Draper, Medo, and Allis-Chalmers, is weakened under this decision.
The union representative is no longer the only one to negotiate with
the employer, since, under certain conditions, minority workers are
also free to negotiate with their employer. Similarly, the employer,
confronted by a minority seeking to negotiate conditions of employ-
ment, may be confused and may wonder if he is committing an
unfair labor practice by conferring with them. Furthermore, major-
ity rule is no longer in effect to the extent a group of workers is no
longer bound by its dictates.
' Support for this result, limiting the union's exclusive powers,
can be found in Title VII, which arguably qualifies the exclusive
authority of the union in the area of equal employment opp .ortunity.
The Western Addition court 131 relied on the language in sections
2000e-2(a)' 32
 and 2000e-3(a),' 33 which label an employer's discrimi-
nation against a worker an unlawful employment practice and
which protect the employee who opposes any such unlawful prac-
tice. The court assumed that the activity in question was an accept-
able means of opposing outlawed discrimination. Considering the
language of the statute and the few cases decided under it, this
interpretation appears valid.' 34
In addition, other sections of Title VII restrict rights otherwise
protected as withidthe union's exclusive powers and thus may help
justify this result. 135
 Sections 2000e-5(a) and (e)' 36 permit an ag-
grieved person to file a charge with the Commission and to initiate
civil action against the employer in a United States district court
without resort to the union representative. The union is also pro-
hibited from discriminating against an individual because he has
participated in any proceeding under section 2000e-3(a).' 37 Simi-
larly, section 2000e-5(h) 138 removes the union's immunities from
injunction under the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 139 These sections of
13° 485 F.2d at 929, 83 L.R.R,M. at 2746.
131
 Id. at 927, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2745.
132
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970).
133 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)(1970).
134
 Cf. Commonwealth v. Hill, 313 F. Supp. 1159 (D.C. Pa. 1970), affd, '439 F.2d 1016
(3d Cir. 1971); Green v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1972), affd, 411
U.S. 792 (1973).
133
 Brief for the EEOC as Amicus Curiae at 16-21, Western Addition Community
Organization v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917, 83 L.R.R.M. 2738 (D.C. Cir. 1973), makes this
argument.
"" 42 U.S.C. ft 2000e-5(a), (e) (1970).
111 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1970).
135 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(h) (1970).
139
 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970). The Norris-LaGuardia Act was enacted to regulate the
issuance of injunctions in labor disputes by federal courts. Because injunctions presented
serious obstacles to the spread of union organization and collective bargaining, this enactment
was a major accomplishment. But § 2000e-5(h) of Title VII allows courts to enjoin activities
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Title VII further indicate congressional intent to limit the exclusive
authority of . the unions in the area of equal employment and reflect
the feeling of Congress that, majority' rule together with the collec-
tive bargaining process have not served the interests of minority
workers. Title VII litigation has also restricted the exclusive powers
of the union. Although a worker was bound to use his contractual
remedies and did in fact exhaust them, ,
 the Fifth Circuit has held
that the employee was not barred from _Title VII relief by a prior
election of remedy.'" Similarly, in a Title VII suit the Sixth Circuit
has refused to apply' estoppel, which arguably was applicable be-
cause of prior arbitration."' In addition to modifying the finality of
contractual remedies, the courts have also prescribed specific steps
to eliminate discrimination despite the existence of a collective bar-
gaining agreement. 142
 Clearly, then, Title VII has made inroads on
the freedom and power of the union representative. But, sections
2000e-5(a), (e) and (h), 2000e-3(a)' 43: and the cases referred to do not
reach the kind of activity the Western Addition court has decided to
protect. These protections either are imposed judicially or come into
effect in the course of formal Title VII procedure. The kinds of
activity the District of Columbia Circuit has decided are per-
missible—leafletting and picketing—are divorced from any judicial
or administrative procedure and thus may be distinguished from
those activities within the protection of these Title VII provisions
and this case law. Consequently the strongest justification for the
Western Addition result is found in' the Title VII sections the court
cite---2000e-2(a) and 3(a).
It is submitted that despite its effects on the union's exclusivity,
the Western Addition decision reaches an equitable result. As Board
Member Jenkins commented, it would be intolerable to allow the
union to control the "scope, direction, pace and degree of elimina-
tion of racial discrimination." 144
 As a result of this decision, there
will be interference with the powers and authority of the union
representative. It is also possible that the employer could, in bar-
gaining with a splinter group, intentionally weaken the union or,
alternatively, become encumbered with an additional negotiating
burden. But these encroachments on orderly collective bargaining
must be balanced against national policies designed to protect
•
that might otherwise be protected under the Norris-LaGuardia Act. See also United States v.
Papermakers Local 189, 282 F. Supp. 39, 43-44,'67 L.R.R.M. 2912, 2914 (E.D. La. 1968).
1" Hutchings v, United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303, 313 (5th Cir. 1970).
141
 Newman v. Avco Corp., 451 F.2d 743, 746 (6th Cir. 1971).
142
 Papermakers Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 71 L.R.R.M. 3070 (5th Cir.
1969). In Papermakers the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's order requiring adoption
of a particular seniority system. 282 F. Supp. 39, 67 L.R.R.M. 2912 (E.D. La. 1968). In so
acting, the district court was aware that it was operating in an area generally reserved for
collective bargaining negotiations. Id. at 45, 67 L.R.R.M. at 2915-16.
143
 Here the reference is to the end of § 2000e-3(a)—concerning participation in a Title
VII proceeding.
I" 192 N.L.R.B. at 176, 77 L.R.R.M. at .1674 (dissenting opinon).
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minority rights in employment: These are rights which are based
upon the Fifth, Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United'
States Constitution. Moreover, recent history has shown that the
unions have not, by any means, taken the lead. in the struggle to
eliminate discrimination.. -
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Wyzanski argued that the
decision did not go far enough. He would not require minority
workers to initiate grievances with the union. Rather, they should
be allowed to present directly to their employer special issues which
arise with respect to the employment of non-whites.' 45 His analysis
circumvents the problems the majority encountered in its reliance on
the R. Can analysis of minority activity. He did not find it
necessary to presume that the union and minority workers have a
common objective—namely, eradication of discrimination. Instead
of accepting the ostensible democratic form of union activities, his
initial premise was that there exists an inevitable conflict between
the minority and the union. He anticipated that any betterment of
black employment conditions would be against the short-term in-
terest of the white majority, for if a black person is promoted, it
follows that a white cannot be promoted for the same job.'" Thus,
his suggested ruling makes no concession to section 9(a) because of
the special circumstances of minority workers.
It is suggested that application of the majority and ,dissenting
opinions would, in most instances, produce similar results. The
question is therefore raised whether the court's compromise between
section 9(a) of the NLRA and Title VII is anything more than
window-dressing. The court's ruling would appear to protect con-
certed activities in almost every instance where the workers at least
approached the union. The majority rule does not require the work-
ers to continue with the grievance procedure 'for any length of time
or through any number of the prescribed steps. Also, the standard to
be used to evaluate' the union's efforts is unusually high. It would
certainly not be the norm for a union to attempt to eradicate the
discrimination to the `Fullest extent possible, and by the most expe-
dient and efficacious means." 147 Furthermore, a worker's activities
will be protected even if based only upon a reasonable belief that the
unionis not reaching this level of performance. In any event, a more
narrow reading of the court's opinion would produce an undesifable
result. If the worker could not easily determine whether or not his
independent activity would be protected, he would have to decide at
his peril when to protest on his own. Such a result was not the
court's intention.
Although it is probable' that the majority and dissent would
produce the same result, there is a good reason for the majority rule.
While not imposing an additional or increased duty on the union,
I" 485 F.2d at 939, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2754 (dissenting opinion).
146 Id. at 937-38, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2753-54 (dissenting opinion).
141 Id. at 931, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2748 (emphasis in the original).
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the effect of the decision may serve to encourage more effective
union action to eliminate discrimination. Union leaders would likely
decide that it was in their best interest to be a party to any negotia-
dons, and they would attempt to take the lead in efforts to eliminate
discrimination. This result would be more in keeping with the
emphasis our national labor policy places on collective bargaining.
HELEN S. RAKOVE
COnstitutional Law—Eleventh Amendment Bars Enforcement of
Fair Lalior Standards Act Against States in Federal
Courts—Employees of the•Department of Public Health & Welfare,
State of Missouri v. Department of Public Health & Welfare, State
of Missouri. '—The petitioners, employees of Missouri , state hospi-
tais and training schools, brought an action under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA)2 in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Missouri, seeking to recover back overtime
wages, an equal amount of liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees.
Sustaining the defendants' motion to dismiss based upon the
Eleventh Amendment, the district court found that this was an
action unconsented to by the State of Missouri, and thus was barred
by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. 3
This decision was reversed by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting in a three-judge panel. 4 Defen-
dants petitioned for a rehearing, whereupon the court, sitting en
banc, set aside the decision of the panel and affirnied the decision of
the district court granting the motion to dismiss. 5 In affirming the
district court's decision, the Eighth 'Circuit stated that this suit was
barred by the original Constitution as well as the Eleventh Amend-
ment, unless the state consented to suit or waived its immunity. 6
Refusing to recognize any congressional power under the commerce
clause' to expressly lift a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity,
the court emphasized that the State of Missouri had not agreed to
' 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
2
 29 U.S.C. § 201-19 (1970):
	 E	 •
3
 See 452 F.2d 820, 822 (8th Cir. 1971), The district court opinion is unreported.
The Eleventh Amendment states: 	 .	 .
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
U.S. Const. amend. XI.	 '
4
 Civil No. 20,204 (8th Cir., April .2, 1971) (unreported). •
5 452 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 823, citing Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Reid, 322 U.S. 47 (1944); Missouri v.
Fiske, 290 U.S. 18 (1933); Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921); Hans v, Louisiana, 134
U.S. i (1889). -
7 U.S. Const, art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
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